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This study analyzes short-run AFDC recidivism among mother-only families.  Findings suggest
that a sizable minority of former AFDC recipients return to AFDC rapidly.  Those most likely to return
to AFDC are those switching jobs, those moving to public housing, those adding children, and those not
getting regular child support payments.  The results also suggest that wages are better predictors of
staying off AFDC than are alternative measures of success in the labor market.   Vulnerability to Future Dependence
among Former AFDC Mothers
I. INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, David T. Ellwood, using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
reported that about 40 percent of mothers who had participated in the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program returned to AFDC after their first spell ended and that 11 percent of those
mothers returned within twelve months (Ellwood, 1986).  Despite the significance of these two findings
and the mounting concern over welfare dependency, little additional information on the repeated use of
AFDC has existed until recently.  
  New sources of data containing enough details on multiple spells of AFDC recipiency have
now permitted researchers to supplement Ellwood's initial findings.  Their work shows that one-time
AFDC recipients who return to AFDC do so quickly.  Weeks (1991), using longitudinal data collected
on low-income female-headed households in the state of Washington, found that 35 percent of persons
who left AFDC returned within two years, with the majority returning within the first year.  Blank and
Ruggles (1994) determined that 20 percent of post-AFDC spells end in returns to AFDC within six
months, on average.  Likewise, Gleason, Rangarajan, and Schochet (1994) found that teenage mothers
have higher recidivism rates than other groups and that their returns to AFDC are quick as well.  
Thus, even though the literature on recidivism is limited, the evidence strongly suggests that
former AFDC recipients who return to AFDC do so very quickly.  
Such brief periods between spells of AFDC receipt suggest that the first few months off
welfare, combined with factors influencing exits in the first place, determine either recurring
dependency or economic self-sufficiency.  What happens to these mothers in the short run, therefore,
during those first few months off AFDC is crucial to understanding recidivism.2
I argue that success in the labor market as well as predictable sources of nonlabor income,
permanent housing, and uniform family size  in the short run are critical factors preventing welfare
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recidivism.  The results here suggest that former AFDC mothers who are unable to secure steady
streams of income quickly, who are unable to afford housing in the private market, and who add
children to their family in the early months of economic independence rapidly return to AFDC, thereby
reducing their family's vulnerability to economic uncertainties.  Basically, the public safety net provides
a secure income floor unattainable through private means.  If minimizing the uncertainty around the
family's level of consumption is the goal, then a woman's decision to return to AFDC is consistent with
this goal.  
The plan of the paper is as follows:  Section 2 describes the methods and data; Section 3
presents the findings; and Section 4 draws some conclusions.
II. METHODOLOGY
Empirical Model
To test my argument—that economic instability early in the transition period, along with
changes in housing arrangements and numbers of dependent children, affects women's decisions to
return to AFDC—I estimate duration models for spells of non-welfare receipt among single mothers
who recently exited the AFDC program.
Like Blank and Ruggles (1994), I allow these spells of non-AFDC receipt (i.e., postprogram
spells) to terminate in one of three ways:  (1) by returning to AFDC; (2) by remaining a single-mother
family without returning to AFDC in the panel period (i.e., becoming right-censored); or (3) by
becoming ineligible for AFDC, either through a marriage, which must last until the end of the survey,
or by losing dependent children.   
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Blank and Ruggles (1994) call the third type of termination "demographic endings," and so do
I, although becoming ineligible for AFDC through marriage is quite different from becoming ineligible
through losing children.  Furthermore, a child can reappear and a marriage can end; either event would
reactivate eligibility for AFDC.  Indeed, 6.6 percent of the marriages ended within the survey's time
frame, triggering new spells of single motherhood and renewing the risk of returning to AFDC.
I use standard reduced-form hazard models to estimate the probability of ending a spell of non-
AFDC receipt with a return to the AFDC program.   The models that I estimate include variables
3
measuring race, work disability, and age at the start of the spell of non-AFDC receipt, as well as
variables measuring changes in marital status, number of children, housing type, and uniformity of
child support payments during the postprogram period.  (See Table 1.)  
To account for other time variation in the data, I include time parameters that are constant
across each four-month period.  As others have emphasized, it is sometimes necessary when using
longitudinal data to include time parameters in models to control for the seam bias problem (Long,
1990; Blank and Ruggles, 1994; Janine et al., 1990).  Four monthly time parameters are needed for the
data used in this study (Singh et al., 1988).
Data Description
To show that volatility in income sources, added children, and changes in household
arrangements in the short run affect recidivism, I use data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP).  SIPP is a longitudinal survey of a random sample of the U.S. population.  The
SIPP panels I use are the 1986, 1987, and 1988 panels, each containing four rotation groups spanning
the period from October 1985 through March 1990.  Each rotation group provides information on 24 or
28 consecutive months.   Each wave of the survey was collected every four months, so each participant
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was interviewed three times a year about his or her monthly experiences over the past four months. 
Thus, the data provide monthly information on household composition, labor market behavior, and4
income sources.  (See Blank and Ruggles [1992, 1993a] for a discussion on the intricacies of using
SIPP data.)
  The SIPP is particularly useful because it has longitudinal information on the welfare
participation, household composition, and labor market experiences of women.  SIPP reports a great
deal more information on a monthly basis than other surveys about sources of income, especially public
assistance income, and labor market attachments.  Monthly data on welfare receipt and earnings make
analyzing welfare exits more accurate, although the length of time to study one or subsequent
transitions is less than that afforded by the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which follows
persons for several years.
Combining the three SIPP panels yields a sample of 12,017 black and white women who
reported that they were mothers (or guardians) of children under the age of 19.   About 90 percent of
5
them (N = 10,743) reported no receipt of income from the AFDC program.  The remaining 1,274
women reported that they were currently unmarried and receiving AFDC income for at least one month
of the panel period.  
The subsample of interest, a panel of single mothers aged between 18 and 44 who ended a spell
of AFDC receipt, is drawn from these 1,274 mothers.  This subsample numbers 557 single mothers
who may or may not have headed households.  (A small fraction of these 557 mothers reported
returning to AFDC within two months.  If no change was measured in either income or family
composition during those two months, I assumed these short AFDC exits reflected administrative
churning and therefore closed the gap between the two spells.)  
Although combining the three SIPP panels provides me with much information on a number of
single mothers who were former AFDC recipients, such a gain does not compensate for each panel
lacking monthly longitudinal data that extends beyond two and a quarter years.  The weakness of the
SIPP data is that it disallows analyses associated with long-term recidivism.  Many of the single5
mothers in my subsample were receiving AFDC when they were first interviewed (N = 344).  Not
knowing if this was a protracted spell of AFDC or if it was one of many short spells biases the
estimated recidivism rate.  In retrospect, each SIPP survey should have queried respondents about the
timing and duration of any past use of public assistance, even if they were not currently receiving
assistance.
For the 557 mothers under study, a record of moves in the labor market, changes in household
composition, and shifts in sources of income was created.  Durations of  jobs, occupations, and housing
arrangements, as well as the number of coresiding children, were added to information collected on
their demographic attributes.  Together, the variables portray the experiences that former AFDC
mothers encountered after ending a spell of receipt of AFDC.  Collectively, these former AFDC
mothers contribute 573 spells of single motherhood off of AFDC.
III. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 contains definitions of the variables appearing in Tables 3, 4, and 5.  Before showing
how major changes in sources of income and household arrangements during the early phase of
economic independence affect returns to AFDC, I first show in Table 2 that my results for the three
SIPP panels are consistent with those of Blank and Ruggles (1994), which they produced by merging
two SIPP panels.
For the 573 postprogram spells, Table 2 shows that about 21 percent ended with the mother
returning to AFDC prior to the end of the survey period.  About 47 percent were right-censored.  The
other 31.7 percent became ineligible for AFDC by marrying or by losing their dependent children.6
TABLE 1
Definition of Variables
Worked always 1 if employed at one job for entire period of panel, 0
otherwise
Promoted  1 if changed occupation but stayed with same employer
and succeeding monthly earnings increased, 0
otherwise
Turnovers Number of jobs terminated during survey
Disabled 1 if disabled in every wave during panel, 0 otherwise
Dis_nowk 1 if disabled across every wave and no employment
across any wave, 0 otherwise
No work 1 if no work across panel period, 0 otherwise
Predwage Predicted wage of respondent over the panel period
Endmar 1 if marriage ended after end of first observed AFDC
spell and respondent returned to spell of single
motherhood, 0 otherwise
Initial kids Number of children under the age of 19 reported at the
beginning of the panel
Post child 1 if a new child either returned to mother or was born
after first observed welfare spell ended, 0 otherwise
Pubsub move 1 if moved into subsidized or public housing, 0
otherwise
Never married 1 if respondent headed own household and never
married during panel period, 0 otherwise
Childsup Number of spells of non-receipt of child support when
respondent should have received monthly payments of
child support
Age 1 if younger than 29 years old, 0 otherwise
White 1 if non-Hispanic white, 0 if black
Education Years of completed schooling
Othinc Log of average amount of household income minus all
household transfers and mother's earnings
Food stamps 1 if reported at least 1 month of food stamp receipt, 0
otherwise
Mean spell length Average duration of a spell7
TABLE 2
Recidivism in AFDC Postprogram Spells
   Number of
Months after   Single-Mother Percentage of Single-Mother Spells off of AFDC  Ending in
    AFDC    Spells after Returns to Demographic   Right
b
 Spell Ends receipt of AFDC   AFDC    Endings Censoring
1-2 573 0.0 16.4 0.0
2-3 555 4.0 0.7 4.7
3-4 524 3.2 1.7 5.5
4-5 487 7.3 0.6 12.9
5-6 382 2.3 6.0 4.9
6-7 353 1.7 1.4 3.1
7-8 333 2.1 0.3 3.3
8-9 320 1.8 0.7 10.9
9-10 243 0.8 6.9 1.2
10-11 235 0.8 0.0 0.8
11-12 229 0.8 2.1 1.7
12-13 219 2.7 1.1 7.8
13-14 173 0.5 1.8 2.8
14-15 165 1.2 2.4 3.0
15-16 158 0.0 1.2 2.5
16-20 151 1.3 3.9 12.0
20-24  92 1.0 4.3 27.0
24-28 29 0.0 3.4 83.2
All spells 573 21.3 31.7 46.9
Mean length of
  postprogram spell   10.0 5.3 7.7 11.9
a
Mean length of all 573 spells of single motherhood following a spell of AFDC receipt.
a
Those that either married and stayed married for the entire period of the survey, or those that lost
b
children.  Those who ended their marriage in the period after receipt of AFDC were considered again at
risk of AFDC receipt (because they were single mothers again) and therefore were not classified as
having a demographic ending.8
Since the distributions of post-AFDC spell endings across the different groups are similar to
those obtained by Blank and Ruggles, the average length of the spells of the three different groups
should be similar as well.  Blank and Ruggles (1994) reported that the mean observed length of spells
for all groups was 9.1 months; I found that it was 10 months.  Results for each group are also similar to
the findings of Blank and Ruggles.  I found that postprogram spells that ended with a return to AFDC
lasted on average about 5.3 months; they reported a mean length of 5.6 months.  Either statistic
indicates that most mothers who return to AFDC do so rapidly. 
These findings show, along with Blank and Ruggles (1994), Weeks (1991), and Ellwood
(1986), that the majority of those who leave AFDC do not return.  But those who do return, return
quickly.  The plot of hazard rates across different time intervals that are presented in Figure 1 further
substantiate this finding, showing that it is within the first six months that women are most vulnerable
to returning to AFDC.  The figure also shows that the probability of AFDC returns averages over 2
percent per month in the first six months after ending AFDC receipt.  After that initial six-month
period, the risk of returning to the rolls becomes low.
Table 2 shows that fewer spells (16.4 percent) ended in the first month after AFDC through
demographic changes than reported by Blank and Ruggles (18.6 percent).  Subsequent months,
however, reflect the same steady, low rate of exit shown in their article.  (See Blank and Ruggles, 1994,
Table 1.)  
Table 3 reports differences between recidivists and non-recidivists.  Recidivists had fewer years
of completed education and were more likely to be disabled  and to have never worked during the
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survey.  All recidivists, not just those who were disabled, were more likely to have reported never
working.  Other descriptive statistics reflect what others have found:  recidivists were more likely to be
black, to have never been married, and to have less unearned income.  (See Ellwood, 1986; Blank and
Ruggles, 1994; Long, 1990.)9
Figure 1 here10
TABLE 3
Characteristics of Single Mothers Who Ended First Observed AFDC Spell
                                   AFDC Exits                                     
    Total 
Postprogram Recidivists Non-Recidivists
    Spells    Spells      Spells
White (%)                  65.0 57.3 67.1
Age  28.6 27.0 29.1
Never married (%) 46.4 63.9 41.6
Endmar (%) 6.6 7.1 6.5
Education 11.2 10.8 11.35
Disabled (%) 9.9 9.8 9.9
Dis_nowk (%) 4.8 5.7 4.6
No work (%) 23.9 29.5 22.4
Othinc $682.83 $439.08 $748.77
Food stamps (%) 93.3 97.6 92.2
Mean spell length 10.0 5.3 11.3
Initial kids 2.09 2.13 2.11
Number of spells 573 122 45111
Results contained in Tables 2 and 3 confirm the rapid returns among those women who return
to AFDC.  Further, the results suggest that there are differences in personal and family characteristics
between those who return to AFDC and those who remain off the program.  I argue that recidivists
differ from non-recidivists in two important ways:  recidivists are unable to maintain a uniform level of
income greater than AFDC benefit levels, and they experience changes in household arrangements in
the immediate period after ending AFDC receipt.
My argument—that economic instability early in the transition period, concomitant with short-
term changes in household arrangements, makes women more likely to return to AFDC—is supported
by findings contained in Tables 4 and 5.  
The chief difference between Tables 4 and 5 is that Table 5 shows results from the alternative
way of modeling the effects of continuous job tenure and job performance on the rate of AFDC
recidivism.  Within Table 5, model 1 shows the effects of a predicted average wage for each mother
("Predwage") alongside the two dummy variable measures of labor force behavior, "Worked always"
and "Promoted."  Then model 2 of Table 5 displays the effects of "Predwage" without the dummy
variables measuring labor force behavior.  
Laying out results in this fashion, across two tables (4 and 5) that contain three alternative
models, demonstrates that the variable measuring average wage levels of mothers yields a better
estimate of the recidivism rate than estimates that are generated from the two dummy variables in
Table 4, "Worked always" and "Promoted."   (See Appendix A and Table A.1 for details on how wages
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were estimated.)  
Although the estimated hourly wage is a stronger predictor of returns to AFDC than are the two
dummy variables, the estimated coefficients for "Worked always" and "Promoted" in Table 4 and
model 1 of Table 5 still indicate that staying attached to the labor market and being promoted reduce
the risk of returning to AFDC. 12
TABLE 4
Competing Risk Duration Models of AFDC Postprogram Spells
a
        Postprogram Spell Following an AFDC Exit†       
  Spell Ends with a Spell Ends with



















Initial kids .112 -.002
(.092) (.080)
Post child .087 1.321***
(.744) (.488)






Number of observations   573
Log likelihood value    -547.85 -781.73
Standard errors in parentheses.
a
* p   .10
** p   .05
*** p   .01
†Models include a control for seam bias and four-month time parameters.13
TABLE 5
Competing Risk Duration Models of AFDC Postprogram Spells:  Alternative Specifications
a
      Spell Ends with a          Spell Ends with
   Demographic Change†          Return to AFDC†      
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Age -.168 -.259 -.070 -.121
(.277) (.272) (.244) (.245)
White .220 .205 -.123 -.114
(.243) (.243) (.184) (.184)
Education .056 .070 .039 .052
(.065) (.070) (.039) (.052)
Never married -4.636*** -4.636*** .885*** .924***
(1.039) (1.035) (.270) (.270)
Endmar .376 .422 .422 .417
(.285) (.284) (.387) (.378)
Disabled -.322 -.371 -.484 -.562
(.440) (.441) (.398) (.398)
Worked always -.090 -- -.414 --
(.319) (.327)
Promoted  -1.006 -- -.832 --
(.751) (.726)
Turnovers .414 .482 .407 .539*
(.312) (.299) (.285) (.276)
Predwage -.266 -.345 -.483** -.591**
(.278) (.269) (.245) (.240)
Initial kids .100 .085 -.014 -.017
(.094) (.093) (.080) (.079)
Post child -.093 .119 1.252** 1.162**
(.744) (.739) (.489) (.484)
Pubsub move -.201 .193 .618** .641***
(.353) (.354) (.243) (.242)
Othinc -.123** -.099 .003 .008
(.060) (.057)* (.043) (.042)
Childsup -.065 -.063 .310*** .293**
(.197) (.136) (.114) (.114)
Number of observations   573
Likelihood value -547.40 -548.59 -779.80 -781.44
Standard errors in parentheses.
a
* p   .10
** p   .05
*** p   .01 
--Variables omitted from specification.
†Models include a control for seam bias and four-month time parameters.14
In Table 4, the estimated negative coefficient for "Worked always" indicates that recidivism
occurred less frequently among women who kept the same job during the entire survey, including the
time when they were on AFDC; moreover, the estimated negative coefficient for "Promoted" suggests
that recidivism was even more less likely among those same women who stayed with one employer but
switched occupations and obtained an earnings increase.  The magnitude of that coefficient (-0.959),
though statistically insignificant, is large relative to the significant coefficient for "Worked always" (-
0.537).  
The estimated coefficient for "Turnovers" in Table 4 is neither statistically significant nor in the
right direction.   Once the predicted wage, "Predwage," is entered into the model of recidivism (column
8
3, Table 5), however, the estimated coefficient for "Turnovers" changes sign.  The significant predicted
wage coefficient (-0.483) is more effective than "Worked always" and "Promoted" at capturing short-
run stability and performance in the labor market.   
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Clearly, having four variables measuring the same construct in model 1 of Table 5 is redundant. 
By replacing "Worked always" and "Promoted" with "Predwage" the model generates results
suggesting that former AFDC mothers with higher predicted earnings in the short run are at lower risk
of returning to AFDC (column 4, Table 5).  And, the positive coefficient for "Turnovers" in column 4
of Table 5 demonstrates that it is not just increases in average wage levels that matter to recidivism but
turnovers in jobs as well.  
Using "Predwage" instead of "Promoted" and "Worked always" uncovers the true effect of
disability status on returns to AFDC as well.  I find, contrary to past studies, that disability status and
returns to AFDC are negatively correlated, not positively correlated, as past studies have suggested
(Ellwood, 1986; Long, 1990; Blank and Ruggles, 1994) and as Table 4, column 2, implies.  
Disability status and welfare returns appeared positively correlated in past studies because those
studies' measures of disability status reflected the relationship between disability status and low15
earnings.  It is not disability status that drives mothers back to welfare but the low earnings resulting
from disability status.  Past studies did not consider this effect that disability status has on earnings. 
The analyses in this study, however, do account for the effect of disability status on earnings in the
estimation of the predicted average wage.  Thus, the models in Table 5 containing the "Predwage"
reveal the true negative effect of disability status on returns to AFDC, once corrected for its effects on
earnings.  
The negative coefficients for "Disabled" across the columns of Table 5 could imply that former
AFDC mothers who are disabled are less likely than others to return to AFDC because their disabilities,
while making them incapable of long-term work, make them eligible for alterative forms of public
assistance, like Supplemental Security Income (SSI).  Theoretically, switching to another public
assistance program would make them no longer at risk of repeat spells of AFDC.  
The findings in Table 5 support my argument that measuring the average levels of wages that
mothers can earn more effectively predicts returns to AFDC.  More generally, the results in column 4
of Table 5 show more clearly than Table 4 that mothers' decisions to stay off AFDC depend on short-
run stability in maintaining levels of earnings higher than AFDC benefit amounts.  
Besides earnings, the models in Tables 4 and 5 also indicate that the availability of nonearned
income sources affects recidivism too.  The models in both tables present evidence consistent with past
studies that levels of household nonearned income affect recidivism.  (See Ellwood, 1986; Blank and
Ruggles, 1994.)  
Household nonearned income is not the only source of nonearned income that may influence
recidivism, however.   The certainty of child support payments should also affect recidivism.  Other
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studies have ignored the effects of the timing of such cash transfers on recidivism.   Yet, I find that
11
recidivism rates are greater among former AFDC mothers who experience highly variable spells of
child support payments.  The estimated coefficients for "Childsup" in Tables 4 and 5 are significant and16
suggest that constant, uninterrupted receipt of child support affects mothers' deliberations about
returning to AFDC.  
Two other pieces of information contained in the models in the last two tables suggest that two
major changes in household arrangements early in the postprogram period also influence the rate of
recidivism.  First, an additional child entering the mother's family  in the early phase of economic
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independence leads to higher rates of recidivism.  I suspect that the magnitude of the estimated
coefficient for "Post child" would increase if births were distinguished from returns of older children to
the family.
Second, Tables 4 and 5 indicate that moving to subsidized housing in the postprogram period
also raises recidivism rates.  The estimated effect is probably biased upward, however, as subsidized
housing is often located in poorer neighborhoods and chosen more often by relatively poorer mothers. 
Nevertheless, the propensity of recidivists to move to subsidized housing is certainly consistent with
Blank and Ruggles' finding (1994) that AFDC reentrants tend to use other public assistance programs. 
Indeed use of in-kind transfer programs, like subsidized housing and food stamps, may signal an effort
to lessen economic vulnerability without returning to AFDC.  From the analyses, however, it seems
more like a prelude to returning to AFDC.
Except for the disability variable, adding variables that gauge the effects of short-run stability
in labor markets and household organization have little impact on the effects of other variables that
have been reported in previous studies (Ellwood, 1986; Blank and Ruggles, 1994).  Greater recidivism
still occurs among black mothers, among younger mothers, among those with more children, and
among those who have never been married.  Besides those variables, the "Endmar" variable suggests
that those 6.6 percent of mothers who had short-lived marriages (i.e., they ended AFDC eligibility
through marriage but then divorced during the survey period) are more likely than others to return to
AFDC.  17
Figure 2 diagrams the estimated hazard rate that is generated from the estimates in column 4 of
Table 5.  The estimated risk of AFDC reentry from the model mimics the original discrete hazard
function plotted in Figure 1.  Both figures reflect the initial high rate of return and the rapid decline in
the risk of reentry after twelve months.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper builds upon previous work on AFDC recidivism.  It bolsters those past studies by
showing that a sizable group of mothers return to AFDC quickly.  The study argues, however, that
understanding the short-run housing arrangements and labor market successes of former AFDC
mothers in the early transition period is crucial.  I find that former AFDC mothers who, in the short run,
have additional children, move to subsidized housing, infrequently receive child support payments, and
achieve no labor market successes are often led back to the consumption floor guaranteed by AFDC.  If
these mothers need any further government assistance after exiting AFDC, then the first few months in
the postprogram period are when they seem to need it most.  
The results are persuasive, yet three important refinements to the models would improve them. 
First, attempting to account for dependence across alternative types of spells (e.g., a spell on AFDC, a
spell off it, and then another spell back on) would generate more efficient estimates of the recidivism
rate.  The length of a previous AFDC spell should affect the behavior of that rate.  Second, correcting
for unobservable individual heterogeneity is another necessary refinement.  Negative duration
dependence is produced without this rectification.  (See Heckman and Singer, 1986.)
   Finally, I make no allowance for the economic and institutional environment within which
these women make re-participation decisions.  If data on those environments were available, I could18
Figure 2 here19
have determined the interaction between state variation in AFDC benefit levels (Blank and Ruggles,
1994) and measures of short-term vulnerability.  2021
Appendix A
The model predicts that wages affect AFDC recidivism rates.  The estimated hourly wage is
calculated from hourly wage levels for each month of the survey period.  Though hourly wages are
unreported in SIPP, it is possible to calculate estimates of hourly wages, with measurement error,
however.  I calculated an hourly wage by matching three pieces of information for every month of the
survey:  monthly reports on earnings, monthly reports on average hours worked per week of a month,
and monthly reports on job status.  Thus, for each month of the survey, there is an average hourly wage
for the month.  Once transformed into the log of hourly wages, this measure is then used as the
dependent variable in regressions predicting wages.  
Limitations in the data prevented me from fully specifying a complete set of variables that may
affect a woman's wage.  However, several key variables are used to predict the average hourly wage for
a woman in the survey.  Mothers' educational levels, past work experiences, headship status, and race
are combined with a variable controlling for seam bias in the SIPP to predict the wages of these
mothers.  Table A.1 shows the results of the semi-log regression.  The summary statistics of the model
and several estimated coefficients indicate that the regression captures some of the variation in mothers'
wages.  The results resemble findings that are common to those derived from Mincer's (1974) earnings
equations.  22
TABLE A.1
Predicting Hourly  Wages of Mothers
a
Variables Coefficient Standard Error
Race 0.004 0.076
Experience 0.058*** 0.018
Experience Squared -0.001* 0.0006
Education 0.105*** 0.016
Never married 0.288*** 0.073





R  = .412, adj R  = .403
2 2
F (9, 563) = 5.73***
Notes:  Mean predicted antilog value = $1.71; Standard error = $1.04.  Range of predicted wage: 
Minimum = $0.00; Maximum = $8.35.
Log of hourly wages
a
* p < .10
*** p < .01h(t,X) lim
t 0
[P(t T t t, X)/ t]
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Here, I focus on increases in the number of dependent children.  Similar effects are possible if
1
additional dependent adults, for example, elderly parents or disabled adult kin, are added to the family
after women leave the welfare rolls.
By losing a child, I mean that the child enters adulthood or moves away from the household.  
2
The hazard rate is defined as a function of both time and a set of explanatory variables.  The
3
empirical equation is   where t is the number of months since
the beginning of the spell and X is a vector of independent variables describing characteristics of the
individual.  The advantages and disadvantages of applying the Cox proportional hazards model to data
recording exits from and entries onto the AFDC program are extensive.  The reader is referred to
Heckman and Singer (1986), Lancaster (1990), and Sueyoshi (1992).  
Rotation group 1 of the 1986 panel was followed for only 24 months instead of 28 months.
4
Hispanics and other ethnic groups in the SIPP are excluded from my analyses.  
5
I highlight disability status in Table 3 because studies on recidivism emphasize that welfare
6
returns and disability status are positively correlated.  (See Ellwood, 1986; Long, 1990; and Blank and
Ruggles, 1994.) 
The omitted reference group in all models consists of women who reported never working
7
during the survey period, even though they did finish an episode of AFDC receipt.  
I know when a change of job also involved a change in both occupation and industry from the
8
three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and Standard Occupation Classification codes that
were recorded for each woman in the survey.  (See Technical Paper 59, "The Relationship Between the
1970 and 1980 Industry and Occupational Classification Systems,"  U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, 1985.)  
Those reentering AFDC had an estimated mean hourly wage of $1.18, while those staying off
9
Notes24
AFDC had an estimated mean hourly wage of $2.17.  
The monthly data collected on child support amounts and coverage allow me to separate this
10
source of nonearned income from other sources of nonearned income.  These data may undercount the
frequency of child support payments or undercount the numbers of families covered by child support
orders if mothers feared that divulging child support information to SIPP would affect their AFDC
receipt.  
There are other types of cash transfers, as well as in-kind transfers.  I focus on child support
11
because of its policy implications and unclarified impact on the lives of former AFDC mothers.
The present analyses clump births in the postprogram spell and returns of other dependent
12
children together.   25
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